

Towards a Jamesian Environmental Philosophy

by

Piers H.G. Stephens,
Michigan State University

Introduction: Pragmatism, Axiology and Environmental Philosophy

Since Anthony Weston's pathfinding 1985 essay 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', environmental pragmatism has developed into a significant school of thought within environmental philosophy and one that has been in a significant tension with the tendency to focus on theoretical issues of axiology, especially questions of intrinsic value. Most of this debate has been based in the USA and has been centred on the claims by certain pragmatists, initially spearheaded by Andrew Light and Bryan Norton, that the theoretical focus on value, especially intrinsic value, in environmental ethics has needlessly divorced it from the practical issues of environmental protection and renewal. Norton, most famously, has deployed a pragmatic convergence thesis in an attempt to defuse the dispute within environmental philosophy between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric perspectives, whilst on the other side, Callicott has been the most fervent supporter of the focus on theoretical axiology¹. My strategy in this paper will be to largely bypass that debate as put in those terms whilst drawing on insights from both sides of it, since I hold *both* that axiological views are practically important *and* that pragmatic naturalism with its emphasis on direct experience offers the best starting point and philosophical framework for locating, expressing and patterning environmental values. To elaborate further, I join with Weston, Norton and other pragmatists in repudiating Callicott's claim that "'intrinsic value" and "noninstrumental value" are two names for the same thing' by invoking alternative forms of noninstrumental value, and further agree with the pragmatist view that practical cognitive orientations come first in the generation of values². However, whilst differing over starting point, framework and axiological detail, at the same time I agree with Callicott in acknowledging that value discourse, if properly supported and constructed, has real practical force on the wider political scale and thus, as the pragmatist Minter puts it, 'when viewed in this fashion noninstrumental values can play an important part in justifying good environmental policy'³. With this central ground in mind, I want to advance the specific philosophical scheme of William James, with its radical empiricism, pragmatism and cognitive breadth as being an ideal framework within which to situate a broader account of environmental value, and in the process give some credibility, *inter alia*, for the sort of intermediate position I have just suggested.

At first one might wish to ask: why William James? It is a striking fact that whilst C.S. Peirce attracts philosophical admiration both within and outside the environmental philosophy subdiscipline and Dewey draws significant loyalty from such figures as Anthony Weston and Hugh P. McDonald, relatively little direct attention has been paid by environmental thinkers to the Jamesian heritage⁴. Even Paul Thompson and Thomas Hilde's wide ranging edited compilation of essays on American environmental

philosophy and the agrarian tradition, which happily finds significant room for such figures as Benjamin Franklin and John Steinbeck as well as the more familiar names of Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, Royce, Peirce and Dewey, gives only passing mention to William James⁵. Aside from the vexed question of Jamesian truth over which so much philosophical ink has been spilled, I believe that two factors have had most influence in causing this neglect of James in environmental philosophy. The first is the widespread perception that Dewey's philosophy, especially insofar as it deals with issues of value and environmental embodiment, both incorporates James's thought faithfully and supercedes it for all our worthwhile purposes; as such, a Jamesian environmental philosopher might appear to be a backward looking and willful contrarian, like someone who restores a Ford Model T and insists on driving it down the freeway. A second factor is the common view that the areas of pragmatism that attract most skepticism from environmental philosophers – the tendencies towards pluralism and subjectivism – are precisely those in which James's thought represents an alarming high water mark, and so even those who are of pragmatist sympathy tend to be wary. This wariness is reinforced by the fact that, as we shall see, James especially amongst pragmatists has been singled out for criticism since the relatively early days of the environmental movement, most notably by Holmes Rolston III. Accordingly, in what follows I shall begin by defending pragmatism in general and James's work in particular from three sets of criticisms. Firstly, I will examine the charges against pragmatism made by Frankfurt School critic Max Horkheimer in his book *Eclipse of Reason*, in which Horkheimer essentially charges pragmatism with being dualist and reductionist in the pejorative senses of these terms, and embodying mistaken divisions between reason and feeling, and as manifesting a runaway form of subjectivist instrumentalism. Drawing on James' own writings I will demonstrate that these views of pragmatism, which are still common on the European left, represent fundamental misunderstandings of the philosophy, especially with regard to James. Secondly, I turn to some criticisms made by Eugene Hargrove which focus in slightly similar fashion upon the apparent subjectivism of the pragmatist focus on experience, associating this with extreme utilitarian instrumentalism. Here I shall touch upon Jamesian psychology and radical empiricism to argue that Hargrove's critique presupposes precisely what is in question in terms of the relationship of subject and object in cognition and epistemology, and point further to the broad regulative ideals of growth that underpin Jamesian pragmatism as repudiating Hargrove's claims of utilitarian narrowness. The third critic I will respond to is Holmes Rolston III, who has criticized James especially as a philosopher who rejects any notion of value in nature, and who associates James' famous essay 'The Moral Equivalent of War' with a declaration of war on the natural realm. In responding to this criticism, I shall argue that careful reading of the texts indicates that James was only referring to (i) his personal religious belief that nature could not be God's *ultimate* spiritual word to humans, and (ii) that 'The Moral Equivalent of War', far from approving a war on nature, expresses approval and a scheme for the promotion of the direct experience and strenuous virtues that James, like many environmentalists today, saw as endangered by an overly commercial society. Finally, I shall argue that Dewey's representations of James's work, and his attempts to transcend and improve it, not only lose us important experiential aspects of James's scheme, but in the process deprive us of much in James's philosophy that is helpful and that can be retrieved and put to good use in environmental ethics and politics today.

Jamesian Environmental Pragmatism: Three Critiques

1) Max Horkheimer: Means, Ends and Reductionism

To deal first with the question of the identification of pragmatism with economic instrumentalism and reductionism, let us examine one of the most eloquent polemics on the theme, namely the attack on pragmatic rationality by Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer writes:

Once it was the endeavour of art, literature and philosophy to express the meaning of things and of life, to be the voice of all that is dumb, to endow nature with an organ for making known her suffering, or, we might say, to call reality by its rightful name. Today nature's tongue is taken away. Once it was thought that each utterance, word, cry, or gesture had an intrinsic meaning; today it is merely an occurrence. The story of the boy who looked up at the sky and asked, 'Daddy, what is the moon there to advertise?' is an allegory of what has happened to the relation between man and nature in the era of formalised reason. On the one hand, nature has been stripped of all intrinsic value or meaning. On the other, man has been stripped of all aims except self-preservation. He tries to transform everything within reach into a means to that end. Every word or sentence that hints of relations other than pragmatic is suspect.... Modern insensitivity to nature is indeed only a variation of the pragmatic attitude that is typical of Western civilisation as a whole. The forms are different. The early trapper saw in the prairies and mountains only the prospects of good hunting; the modern businessman sees in the landscape an opportunity for the display of cigarette posters.... Pragmatic reason is not new. Yet the philosophy behind it, the idea that reason, the highest faculty of man, is solely concerned with instruments, nay, is a mere instrument itself, is formulated more clearly and accepted more generally today than ever before. The principle of domination has become the idol to which everything is sacrificed.⁶

Horkheimer goes on to maintain, in tones which anticipate the contemporary social ecologist, that the 'history of man's efforts to subjugate nature is also the history of man's subjugation by man', and that this twofold history is reflected in the development of the concept of the ego. Moreover, the ego principle is seen as being 'related to the functions of domination, command and organisation'; in spiritual terms, it has the quality of a ray of light which, in penetrating the darkness, 'startles the ghosts of belief and feeling, which prefer to lurk in the shadows'. In a historical perspective, the ego principle 'belongs pre-eminently to an age of caste privilege marked by a cleavage between intellectual and manual labour', and at its apex in contemporary life, the 'entire universe becomes a tool of the ego, although the ego has no substance or meaning except in its own boundless activity'⁷.

Horkheimer is by no means alone in this characterisation of pragmatism; Morris Cohen, for instance, saw the pragmatist philosophical movement as one which 'reflects the temper of an acquisitive society feverishly intent on mere accumulation, and morally afraid to discriminate between what is worthwhile and what is not'⁸. Indeed, this type of critique is still common in certain sections of the European left today, and even generally sympathetic

writers on pragmatism have tended to allow some validity to these criticisms; Lloyd Morris's concession that 'in a competitive and acquisitive society that exalted the goals of wealth and power, the notion that whatever "works" is right could be perverted to sanction nearly all forms of social and economic abuse' is quite representative here⁹. But we should note that Morris's view is that this is a perversion of pragmatism, and not, as is the case with Horkheimer's characterisation of the creed, an inevitable concomitant of it. With this in mind, let us consider Horkheimer's accusations against pragmatist rationality and see if they are justified.

Firstly, we should note that the attack is voiced largely in dualistic terms; metaphorically contrasts of light to shadow, intellectual to manual labour, and man to nature are attributed to the pragmatic perspective. Secondly, Horkheimer implicitly adopts a notion of objective truth about reality in his preferential assertion that we should 'call reality by its rightful name', and goes on to focus on the intrinsic meaning of expression, thus focusing on ends rather than means, in contrast to pragmatic thought which he sees as being fixated upon the latter. Such a criticism views pragmatism as necessarily an ally of runaway instrumentalism, in which no end is fixed, but revisability of goal is all, and so the goal we strive for today becomes the means we deploy tomorrow, and it does so in such a way as to assume that *economic* instrumentalism is favoured. Thirdly, Horkheimer's critique associates instrumentalism per se with the principle of egoistic domination, and though concentrating on the socio-economic realm, does not distinguish areas or parameters of legitimate or illegitimate instrumentalism. Fourthly, and most clearly, the association of pragmatism with experiential reductionism is assumed as basic.

Dealing with these points in turn, Horkheimer appears to wholly overlook the fact that James's philosophy was explicitly designed to bridge the divides between reason and feeling, intellect and practice, subject and object. James's persistent epistemological assertion that 'you can't weed out the human contribution', was in part precisely an insistence that our emotions unavoidably enter into even the most abstract of theorising¹⁰. Similarly, his principle that our 'passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds', along with his abiding mistrust of formal logic and mathematics, are further injunctions from the same stable against the splitting of feeling from the category of rationality¹¹. Nor is it any easier to indict James of intellectual snobbery in terms of a cleavage between mental and manual work, for James's writings are clearly opposed to the dichotomy. James saw it as important that 'the narrowest trade or professional training does something more for a man than to make a skilful practical tool of him' for 'it makes him also a judge of other men's skill'; whether this trade 'be pleading at the bar or surgery or plastering or plumbing, it develops a critical sense in him for that sort of occupation'¹². Such a critical sense was vital for James, and was manifested to a large extent in manual as much as intellectual activity. Indeed, the two overlap significantly, for the 'feeling for a good human job anywhere, the admiration of the really admirable, the disesteem of what is cheap and trashy and impermanent, this is what we call the critical sense', which in James's eyes 'is the better part of what men know as wisdom'¹³. From this point of view, Horkheimer's critique is strange, for he earlier attacks pragmatism precisely for its involvement in praising the craftsman, seeing this as part of a 'triumph of the means

over the end', and linking this to his assertion that pragmatism 'is the counterpart of modern industrialism, for which the factory is the prototype of human existence'¹⁴. As we shall see, this association of craft work per se with the mechanised ethos is part of what has led Horkheimer astray so far as James is concerned, for uncritical approval of mechanised and 'successful' capitalism was no part of James's intellectual position.

Enough, for the moment, of Horkheimer's charges on social dichotomies; the question of man and nature, and of natural and human instrumentalism toward the natural environment is more complex and will be dealt with in my response to Rolston. However, so far as the second and third characteristics of Horkheimer's criticism is concerned, his implicit objectivism and characterisation of pragmatism as a form of freewheeling instrumentalism, along with his attachment of pragmatism to an abstract domineering ego and refusal to distinguish forms of instrumental activity, one cannot help but see some confusion. It is true that pragmatists reject strong axiological objectivism, but I would point out that Horkheimer's usage of objectivism here and throughout *Eclipse of Reason*, presupposes the existence of a subject-object epistemological framework as foundational, and as such, the primordial immediacy of experience which James sought to deal with by means of radical empiricism, and which *precedes* the distinction of subject and object in the overall Jamesian system, has been expunged from Horkheimer's characterisation of pragmatic rationality. But for James, pragmatism and radical empiricism were complementary, albeit logically distinguishable; whilst acknowledging in *Pragmatism* that 'there is no logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and ... radical empiricism' he clearly maintained in *The Meaning of Truth* that acceptance of the pragmatist account of truth would nonetheless constitute 'one great point in the victory of radical empiricism'¹⁵. Once we acknowledge this important connection of the two in the Jamesian scheme, Horkheimer's accusation can be seen to miss its mark. Similarly, the claims for existence of an abstract ego are off-beam; James's theory of the stream of consciousness in psychology, translated to the doctrine of pure experience in his philosophy, acknowledges and defends the idea of the self but quite explicitly rejects any concept of the transcendental ego as spurious and unnecessary, and hence the attribution of a domineering antagonistic dualism here is wholly inappropriate¹⁶. Moving on to the charges of freewheeling instrumentalism and experiential reductionism, Horkheimer appears to forget that the pragmatism advanced by James was intended primarily as an account of epistemological method, not an expansive *weltanschauung* to cover all relational modes. James was clear in his statement that pragmatism 'has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method' and followed the Italian pragmatist Papini in likening the pragmatic method to a hotel corridor, from which innumerable chambers open out, but which 'all must pass through if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms'¹⁷. Moreover, the anti-commercial thrust of Horkheimer's work, the opposition to the commodification of the world, is a bias with which James would be inclined to agree. The disagreement, rather, would be over whether pragmatism encourages, or can be blamed for, such developments. Ever a morally concerned man but not politically active until the last decade of his life, James was horrified by what he saw as the rise of American imperialism as manifested in the war against Spain, and spoke fervently against what he regarded as the characteristic vices of an increasingly acquisitive society, characterising them as: 'swindling and adroitness, and the indulgence of swindling and adroitness, and cant, and sympathy with cant - natural fruits of that extraordinary

idealisation of "success" in the mere outward sense of "getting there", and getting there on as big a scale as we can, which characterises our present generation¹⁸. James, notwithstanding Horkheimer's accusations, was no friend to large scale capitalist reduction of the experiential qualities of human life, and firmly resisted the accusation that pragmatism was implicated. Although involving action and recourse to experience as the last theoretic court of appeal, pragmatism in James's hands was never merely an appeal to instrumentalist action, and though he conceded that in this context the term had proved to be an unfortunate choice, he nonetheless firmly resisted attempts to paint pragmatic philosophy in reductive terms:

But no word could protect the doctrine from critics so blind to the nature of the enquiry that, when Dr Schiller speaks of ideas `working' well, the only thing they think of is their immediate workings in the physical environment, their enabling us to make money, or gain some similar `practical' advantage. Ideas do work thus, of course, immediately or remotely; but they work indefinitely inside the mental world also. Not crediting us with this rudimentary insight, our critics treat our view as offering itself exclusively to engineers, doctors, financiers and men of action generally, who need some sort of a rough and ready *weltanschauung* but have no time or wit to study genuine philosophy. It is usually described as a characteristically American movement, a sort of bobtailed scheme of thought, excellently fitted for the man on the street, who naturally hates theory and wants cash returns immediately.¹⁹

Before moving on to the two other possible sources of environmentalist objections to pragmatism, and remaining in the light of Horkheimer's objections for the moment, it is worth recalling James's praise of the artisan in the context of being able to appreciate a job well done. For James was strongly opposed to the impersonal and greedy ethos of `big management', and in favour of small-scale organisation; in this sense, he would again find common ground with Horkheimer in an emphasis on the organic, and a shared repugnance at a world in which a child may sincerely ask what the moon advertises. In terms that would commend themselves to the bioregionalist, the direct democrat and the eco-anarchist, James declared himself `against bigness and greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible molecular moral forces that work themselves from individual to individual, stealing through the crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, and yet rending the hardest monuments of man's pride, if you give them time'²⁰. Not only is the use of naturalistic imagery striking here, but it illustrates the point that, far from being the apostle of an all-domineering instrumentalist ego, James was a strong critic of both emerging monopoly capitalism and statist bureaucratic empire building, one who unequivocally stated his position in opposition to `all big organisations as such, national ones first and foremost..all big successes and big results' and held that the `bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed'²¹. If we combine this perspective with James's objections in the defence of pragmatism given and his praise of the craftworker's critical sense, a very different view may be sketched of James's perspective than that which Horkheimer objects to. It is a perspective in which good work involves understanding, care, appreciation and human-scale organisation, rather than cheap mass-produced shoddiness for `cash returns immediately'; in which the quality of an individual's relationship to their tasks is respected and taken seriously, and is thus supportive

of the skilled traditional craftsman against the built-in obsolescence of impersonal factory production. As such, James's perspective here might have more in common with Schumacher's 'Buddhist economics' than with modern expansionism²².

The key to Horkheimer's misreading of pragmatism may well lie hereabouts. The objectivist implications of Horkheimer's critique seem to indicate that he regards the focus on the incursion of subjectivity into relations with the perceptual object as legitimating the acquisitive impulses of capitalist society by loosening claims to lasting intrinsic meaning; with reduction to use-value dominant, and use-value itself defined by the parameters of the capitalist market, crude economic instrumentalism is left unimpeded. Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold, the cost-benefit analysts are loosed upon the world. In fairness to Horkheimer, James's failure to supplement his views with a social theory certainly was unfortunate in leaving the field open for his pragmatism to be rhetorically perverted by powerful interests; nonetheless, Horkheimer also badly misrepresents the doctrine by reading it, in practical terms, as a manifesto for those very interests when in fact James's political activities were profoundly antagonistic to them. It is one thing to argue that the Jamesian 'success' criterion needed supplementing in order to avoid being co-opted into the service of a neo-Lockean expansionist master narrative, but quite another to suppose, as Horkheimer does, that the criterion must therefore be read as supportive of that dynamic. Moreover, the thought that the critical qualities possessed by pragmatism might be as well utilised by radicals as by capitalists does not appear to occur to Horkheimer; the significance of the fact that James, in defining the 'the true' as being 'only the expedient in our way of thinking', added the vital rider '*expedient in the long run and on the whole*' is wholly missed²³. This leads us to the second objection, the association of pragmatism with utilitarianism of the type associated with economic theory, and for an example of this accusation, we turn to the work of Eugene Hargrove.

2) Eugene Hargrove: Utilitarianism, Pragmatism and Instrumental Triggers

One advantage of Jamesian pragmatism, in my view, is the avoidance of a subject-object dichotomy as epistemological beginning, yet the confusion of anthropocentrism with subjectivism has caused much ire. A representative attack is Hargrove's, incorporating several of the charges that have been laid at pragmatism's door. Hargrove associates pragmatism with economic utilitarianism, and hence with reducing nature to a set of aesthetic instrumental triggers:

Pragmatism, with its stress on instrumental values and its disdain for intrinsic values, is, through the conservation philosophy of Gifford Pinchot, responsible for the conversion of natural objects into instrumental triggers for the generation of aesthetic pleasures in the minds of humans. This conversion... runs counter to the more traditional view that objects of beauty are valuable for their own sake, *without regard to their use...*²⁴

There are four interlinked charges here: subjectivism, anthropocentrism, economism and reductionism. The first two are directly equated, the third is a historical claim via Pinchot, and the fourth assumes that a separation of beauty and use has been illegitimately

overridden. Hargrove's attack targets pragmatism's perceived shift from focusing on the aesthetic object to focusing on the experience *of* the object, and thus damns pragmatism as anthropocentric in both usual pejorative senses, as instrumentalist *and* conceived in terms of human consciousness.

This view of pragmatism as subjectivist in an inherently anti-ecological way surely confuses two things: the *locational* fact that the human agent feels the experience, and the *character* of the valuing involved. In demanding an immediate categorisation of subjectivity, it also presupposes a primordial discrete separation of subject and object in the experiential event, thus automatically granting the epistemological primacy of the very gap that James questioned in his radical empiricism, and then imputing an acquisitive, economically reductive vision of the subject's agency and motives. In short, if pragmatism is to be repudiated as *necessarily* anthropocentric due to its 'subjectivism', this must assume the presence of an instrumentalist and/or economic bias within the human subject as conceived by pragmatism. Yet this is not the case. James is clear on the contribution of psychological interests to what we classify as reality:

Out of all the visual magnitudes of each known object we have selected one as the *real* one to think of and degraded all the others to serve as its signs. This 'real' magnitude is determined by aesthetic and practical interests. It is that which we get when the object is at the distance most propitious for exact visual discrimination of its details.²⁵

James thus includes aesthetic interests on a par with 'practical' ones amongst the primary functions of selective consciousness, but this is hardly to categorise them as economic uses, for that would require a hierarchisation not present here. In fact, his conception of human consciousness and agency, focuses on the *breadth* of potential fulfilments, and as such it has far more affinities with Muir's views than Pinchot's²⁶. Indeed, historically associating Pinchot's reductionist philosophy with pragmatism is highly suspect, for as Bryan Norton observes, the connectedness of Pinchot's perspective was bought 'by reducing all human values to utilities associated with democratically distributed *material consumption*, but at the cost of... aesthetic and other important values'²⁷.

As already implied, James was profoundly opposed to such reductionism, both in relation to the breadth of human interests and – most significantly here - in relation to the relationship between direct experience and representation. Recalling his friend Louis Agassiz, James recounts that Agassiz 'so taught me the difference between all possible abstractionists and all lives in the light of the world's concrete fullness, that I have never been able to forget it' and whilst both types of mind have their place, 'there can be no doubt as to which kind lies nearer the divine' for '*the truth of things is after all their living fullness*'²⁸. This was no isolated utterance, and James's insistence on the priority of experience against formalisations of it is the key difference between his thought and that of his friend and fellow pragmatist Peirce²⁹. It is vital to James's mistrust of formal abstraction and belief that the real is richer than the logical, and it plays a central role in his use of radical empiricism to undercut the subject-object epistemic base.

The real problem seems to lie in Hargrove's assumption that once we allow human experience to be the arbiter rather than believing beauty to exist independently of consciousness or be an end in itself, we are committed to believing that natural beauty must be a *use-value* of the type associated with narrow economic utilitarianism. But if it is not the pragmatist who is importing this motivational assumption, it must be Hargrove. Presupposing the contingencies of our current order with its Lockean acquisitive assumptions, he implicitly characterises interested consciousness as an asset-stripper engaged in appropriating 'useful experiences' in ever larger quantities, and then ascribes these attributes of consciousness to the pragmatist model. The *contingent* thought that a subjectivist position would be dangerous and open to reduction is an understandable fear in our actually existing society, in which the commodification of all things proceeds apace, and as with Horkheimer, one can sense the worry behind it. Against this social background, Hargrove's concern that natural beauty not be conflated with use seems reasonable, so long as it is taken in a strictly preservationist context. The legitimacy in Hargrove's worry lies in the likely reduction of natural beauty first to use-value and then to market exchange-value. However, since in this case the reductionist is moving from the products of direct experience to abstract definition of experiential worth, and then on to a further abstract representation in the form of economic exchange value, the moves being made are reductive in ways that James would be inclined to resist both epistemologically and morally, and such resistance can be articulated without recourse to Hargrove's use/beauty distinction. Indeed, although it may be one way of articulating some significant intuitions, arguably the use/beauty distinction may do more harm than good in the broader context of environmental issues: it seems to me to have little application in relation to valuing artifacts, for instance, since such items are designed for use, and beauty can be included in this ledger as a part of usefulness, as environmental traditions like William Morris's eco-socialism remind us. A pragmatic refusal to split aesthetic from practical concerns in the artifactual context, moreover, enables us to avoid thinking of preservation areas in projective use-value terms, but stay in line with thinkers like Morris and Schumacher in the area of artifactual production. To assume that interested consciousness operates only on predefined use-values in the way that Hargrove does is to significantly misconstrue the pluralist and anti-reductive character of Jamesian pragmatism.

Significantly, what is missed in the assumption is precisely the elements of immediacy in consciousness that James's account of interested consciousness validates: the stimulus of novelty that provokes *interest*, but which cannot be pre-defined as a use and thus does not fit onto either side of a pre-existing means-ends ledger. It is this aspect of James's thought that is most vital to us in his account of consciousness and his radical empiricism. The presence of these as important elements in human psychology and wellbeing is well documented³⁰, as it is in other animals³¹. We might say that when our attention is drawn to an item, then that item is *of interest* to us, but this does not mean that the object has been *defined in terms of use* in the strong sense which Hargrove implies; that definition, if it comes, will come only with time and reflection. The beauty that strikes the eye and draws our attention, the unexpected cry of a bird up above: these are received through the *interest* of consciousness, but this does not make them use-values at the immediate experiential level. A use-value is *defined* in argument, we value its use *for* something which we have categorised and can

specify *in advance*, whereas the point about interested consciousness is precisely that its fluidity contains elements which can *not* be predefined or squeezed happily into a means-ends ledger. *Being interested* in the way described may eventually produce a 'useful' application, but is not of itself a use.

The real problem comes with language, not human consciousness. When the economist asks 'what's the use of it?', we try to answer in those terms, and in defining its use in advance of experiences which we and others may yet have of it, we implicitly accept the assumption that the contents of human activity and consciousness can be wholly mapped in terms of means-ends relations. Yet this assumption embodies an appropriative model of consciousness, leaving out the option of letting something *be*. A better response might be to borrow Benjamin Franklin's answer: 'What is the use of a new-born baby?'³². The example is significant in considering consciousness, for once we define a natural area in solely means-ends terms, we have altered our perception of it, implicitly refusing to allow it to first inform us. 'A source of hydro-electric power' or 'a recreational resource' *are* different, *become* different, from the 'stream beside the birches', though they refer to the same physical area, and the difference is initially by virtue of having been defined in *solely* instrumental terms. Thus to answer the economist's question in their own terms is already partly to shift away from the multiplicity of relational potentialities an item may offer *to us* and on to a definition of that item as if it existed *for us and our purposes*, and an intuitive awareness of this may well help explain the curious inarticulacy that many environmentalists feel in trying to explain what is wrong with being asked to defend their views by definitions in terms of use-values. Hence, in turn, the impulse to block the 'use' question by shifting nature to the 'intrinsic'-cum-'objective ends' side of the ledger.

Both political and theoretical worries motivate such objectivism. The political worry is that the radical green agenda may be bought off or watered down if it fails to claim objectivity, whilst the theoretical reason owes much to Regan's influential early distinction between an ethic *of* the environment and an ethic *for the use of* the environment. The latter distinction surely suffers from an indiscriminate demonisation of the term 'instrumentalism', largely jettisoning the possibility that human interests may be more relational and less reducible to what neo-classical economists conceive of them as being, and thus conceding much unnecessary ground to the anti-environmentalist³³. The underlying assumption in both cases is pessimistic, that only tightly objective axiological rules will keep the selfish human subject following the green path of righteousness. This compares oddly with more optimistic traditions of green thought about human potential, such as those of anarchism, utopian socialism and the Romantic movement. Some form of *rapprochement* seems called for, and I maintain that the Jamesian account of consciousness and perception, in which the receptivity of the subject to the ongoing experiential flux is central, fits well with such a resolution.

This brings us to the supporting perceptual theory. James's account of selective consciousness and perception is relational, with the reality attained from our senses being, to use a suitably Wordsworthian phrase, 'what they half create, and what perceive'³⁴. The reference to Wordsworth is not insignificant: as Russell Goodman has noted, reading Wordsworth was a significant positive influence in James's successful battle against

neurasthenia and depression in 1873, along with his better known reading of Renouvier, and a Wordsworthian sensibility features in his work sufficiently for Goodman to declare James 'a Romantic in his basic vision'³⁵, while the relational emphasis in his perceptual theory embodies both romantic aesthetic sensitivity and a clear scientific basis in evolutionary theory. This relational perception, unlike the viewpoint of simple hedonic utilitarianism, is a complex evolutionary result. Consciousness evolves in environmental interaction, loading the Darwinian dice in favour of organisms possessing it, a loading that 'will amount to its selecting responses congruent with the interests of the organism', such as 'useful discharge', 'appropriate direction', 'right reaction', 'beneficial interaction with environment' and so forth³⁶. The question of the psychological derivation of ethical ideas thus gains solidity: for the Jamesian pragmatist, the question comes down to 'an analysis of the activities whereby the brain coordinates and structures sensory information in ways that best serve the individuals' adaptation to the wider environment'³⁷. There is accordingly a Darwinian quasi-essentialist support to the scheme, but it need not be reductionist nor, given the multiplicity of possible requirements of consciousness and James's fallibilism, is it a rigid essentialism of the type politically associated with authoritarianism³⁸. It is non-teleological, emphasising the diversity of values and capacities evolved through biological and social development. James's scheme thus promises a backing that is naturalistic but not reductionist³⁹. Indeed, this aspect of James's scheme, as we shall see, is one of the areas where his views fruitfully diverge from Dewey's. Such a view of environmentally interactive consciousness need not be anthropocentric, for the fact that we can know only human consciousness from the inside does not entail that it is the only type we should consider⁴⁰. Such a scheme is thus, at most, only locationally anthropocentric, and offers a form of naturalism that resists the sort of economic reductionism that Hargrove fears, as well as being pluralist in issues of valuing, rather than reducing all to the single value of utility maximising preference satisfaction that Hargrove assumes and fears. I shall say more about the role of novelty and the character of experience in the Jamesian scheme in due course, but must next turn to Rolston's critique.

3) Rolston and James: War on Nature?

The next objection to a use of James is that of inappropriateness, and comes from Holmes Rolston III, who has cited James as a subjectivist anti-nature villain more than once. Two James passages and an essay, 'The Moral Equivalent of War', are his bugbears, the last of which he interprets as an injunction for moral war against nature⁴¹. Yet the passages he cites are actually from other essays, firstly:

Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference - a moral multiverse...and not a moral universe. To such a harlot we owe no allegiance; with her as a whole we can establish no moral communion; and we are free in our dealing with her several parts to obey or to destroy, and to follow no law but that of prudence in coming to terms with such of her particular features as will help us to our private ends.⁴²

Such a citation initially appears wholly damning. Yet Rolston ignores the statement's context, namely the essay 'Is Life Worth Living?', which deals with James's religious thought; this was an area deeply significant to James personally but not indissolubly linked

to the frameworks of pragmatism and radical empiricism. Moreover, the question which James is trying to answer here is whether we should follow nature in what Rolston calls 'an imitative ethical sense', taking natural conduct as a moral guide. James, with his Darwinian background, knew that nature was a scene of carnage at the individual level, and in that sense, it was obvious that nature was the antithesis of morality. It was this which provoked the passage cited, a fact which Rolston nowhere mentions - despite his own agreement with James that in *that* sense, nature is not to be followed. Moreover, James admits his theologico-moral perspective to be a 'personal opinion unreservedly' on the very page which Rolston cites, and clarifies his position as being that 'nature, such as we know her, cannot be its [a divine Spirit's] *ultimate word* to man', a statement that hardly denies the possibility of *some* spiritual or moral significance⁴³. Again, Rolston mentions neither point, nor does he register that James's reference to a 'multiverse' rather than a 'universe' is actually indicative of the breadth and diversity of nature for James, that this factor may of itself militate against arrogant claims of finality in ethics. Indeed, this last point is highly significant, for what James is engaged in within the essay is to argue that 'visible nature' cannot be the *whole* story in unified, coherent seeking of grounds for our moral responsibilities, and it is partly for this reason that he seeks to postulate a supernatural realm that is not part of 'visible nature' in the everyday sense but is nonetheless real and a part of direct human experience, the sorts of direct spiritual experiences that he examined in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. But this claim that visible nature is too irreducibly diverse to act as a last spiritual or moral word, and that at any given time we only encounter one 'private' portion of it, is far from the view that nature holds no value at all.

A similar story holds with Rolston's citation of James's statement that values are 'pure gifts of the spectator's mind'. Rolston reads this through the Cartesian dichotomy, assuming that James is adopting an anthropogenic position, in which value is projected out onto the world by humans in Humean fashion. But James's actual view is that experience is an ontological category *preceding* the dichotomy of subject and object, and value is thus a part of any world we can know; it is not projected afterwards as Rolston supposes. Rolston also ignores the context, namely a thought experiment from James's religious work, and neglects to note that James's writing for popular audiences caused him occasionally to express himself with more vivacity than clarity, sometimes resulting in confusion as to his meaning, as is evidently the case here⁴⁴. We should note too that James's rejection of immanence in favour of transcendence in his religious thinking was no inevitable consequence of his pragmatism. If anything the reverse is more likely, for as Graham Bird observes, the basic thrusts of pragmatism and radical empiricism being 'clearly linked with an emphasis on immanence rather than transcendence'⁴⁵.

Why does Rolston not cite the 'Moral Equivalent of War' itself, interpreted as a call to arms against the natural world? Perhaps because it is actually far too ambiguous. Though I cannot give a detailed reading here, James takes a median position between pacifists and the believers in 'martial virtue', citing his belief in 'the reign of peace' and 'the gradual advent of some sort of socialistic equilibrium', but holding that peace neither 'ought nor will be permanent on this globe, unless the states pacifically organised preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline', since 'a permanently successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy'⁴⁶. James's argument, belatedly resurrecting a little of the

Spencerian influence that he had transcended years earlier - his general position on human nature was much more positive - was that war, historically, had successfully trained human collectivities to social integration and individual self-respect, and his fear was that the absence of such vigorous stimuli could create decadence and collapse. This was a fear that was common to many at the time, as the optimistic Victorian view that evolution and the ideology of progress were easily harmonised came under serious sceptical scrutiny. Thomas Huxley, for example, suggested in *Evolution and Ethics* (1893) that society was developing in ways antithetical to human nature, quite possibly leading in the end to civilisation's downfall; in similar vein, popular stories such as H.G. Wells's 'The Time Machine' (1895) and E.M. Forster's 'The Machine Stops' (1909) expressed a growing scepticism towards luxury and technological dependence at the very time that James himself was protesting at the materialistic excesses of commercial America⁴⁷. Pragmatically attempting to take the best from both pacifism and supporters of martial qualities, James complained that 'the luxurious classes now are blind' to 'man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life', and proposed 'a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against *Nature*'. The purpose of this, contra Rolston, was *not* to destroy or attack nature per se, but rather to ensure that certain virtues were preserved by direct experience of earning one's corn: 'military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought in the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life'. Afterwards those who had played their part would have 'done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against nature' which would 'preserve in the midst of a pacific civilisation the manly virtues which the military part is so afraid of seeing die out in peace'⁴⁸.

I shall not discuss the murky sexual politics of the last remark⁴⁹, but will focus on the relation to nature involved. James was no believer in natural bounty, and his proposal was to even out injustices of harsh work in agriculture and industry by ensuring that all had to do their share. He aims to maintain the best and richest balance of goods, and holds that human existence involves struggle as part of the natural evolutionary state of affairs. As such, he is expressing the psychological need for *necessary* experience of instrumentality toward nature for continued human flourishing, not a moral crusade as Rolston supposes, and indeed his view is arguably much closer to that of Leopold and Rolston himself than the latter allows. There is, for instance, a striking parallel between James's reference to such dealings with nature as a 'blood-tax', Leopold's view that 'it must be poor life that knows freedom from fear' and Rolston's description of hunting as 'a *sacrament* of the fundamental, mandatory seeking and taking possession of value that characterises an ecosystem and from which no culture ever escapes'⁵⁰. The reason why James's suggestion is a moral *equivalent* of war, rather than actually *being* a war against nature, lies in its production of character and collective virtue, just as apprenticeships or military service taught skills and self-discipline in earlier history, and it is this which is *moral* about the proposal. Moreover, not only were James's invocations to traditional virtues partly motivated by his moral revulsion at growing American commercialism, but the nearest take-up to his suggestion was Franklin Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps. Indeed, in a certain sense James himself actually anticipated just this development: Gerald Myers notes that he 'encouraged his two eldest

sons, Henry III and William, Jr., to get a taste for the moral equivalent by working in the summer for the United States Forestry Service in Washington' and that 'James's letters to Henry III during that time indicate that he thought the wilderness experience would do his sons good'⁵¹.

We may thus conclude, I think, that the most typical attacks on both pragmatism and James in relation to axiology miss the mark. Accordingly, I shall now turn to disentangling the Jamesian heritage from Dewey's work, and then to giving positive reasons for the adoption of a Jamesian pragmatic naturalist framework.

Transcending Dewey-Eyed Pragmatism: Towards a Jamesian Environmental Philosophy

As previously noted, the view that William James stands in John Dewey's historical and philosophical shadow is a pervasive one. It is an impression reinforced by the fact that Dewey was not only a fellow pragmatist but James's personal friend, and that the debt he felt to James for leading him out of his unhappy Hegelian phase resulted in him defending and lionising James and expounding his philosophy right up into the middle 20th century. Moreover, the breadth and extent of Dewey's works, covering a wide range of fields such as ethics and aesthetics that James only lightly touched upon in his philosophical work, make it unsurprising that so many regard Dewey both as James's successor and superior. It may therefore seem curious to some that significant differences can be found between them, and that these importantly occur in relation to Dewey's interpretation of James's key works. Yet, it is so, and in what follows I want first to indicate significant ways in which James's account differs from Dewey's, and the give two areas in which these differences may give a Jamesian account significant advantages for environmental philosophy.

1) James, Dewey, Introspection and Experience

In a superb recent systematic re-examination of James's work and what Dewey made of it, Richard M. Gale charges Dewey with giving a 'blatantly distorted, self-serving account of James's philosophy, the basic aims of which were to despoofify and depersonalize it so that it would agree with Dewey's naturalism and socialization of all things distinctively human'⁵², in the process losing much that is valuable and distinctive about James's real position. Though much could detain us here, I shall focus on those areas which a Deweyan version of James expunges, and their significance for environmental thought.

Firstly, the James that Dewey gives us is one inclined to naturalism in the scientific sense: that is to say, one who holds a view whereby science alone gives us knowledge of reality, and every kind of individual can in principle have its general nature determined through scientific enquiry. Shading into this, Dewey maintains, especially in his 1940 essay 'The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James', that the idea of the self steadily fades out of James's thought as the chapters of the *Principles of Psychology* progress, and that James's development of the concept of pure experience actually supplants the earlier notion. However, in doing this, as Gale points out, Dewey remains selectively blind to James's insistence on a libertarian doctrine of the will in his *Principles of Psychology* chapters on "Attention" and "Will"; in the process he allows the strong Jamesian insistence on freedom

of the will and the strong moral subject to be faded or even dissolved due to his own scientific credentials, creating a misleading impression of a 'vanishing subject' when the Jamesian subject does not in fact so vanish. Moreover, this is especially unfortunate because in the process a significant philosophical achievement has been obscured: in the ignored chapters of the *Principles*, James explains the emergence of free will in terms of the amount of effort directed at attending to an idea entering consciousness, regarding this as a conscious and irreducible event that is not itself causally determined, and given the frequent problems that various types of naturalism have with this issue, it is perhaps surprising that his efforts here have not been given more attention. As Gale puts it, 'James's version of libertarianism is far superior to that of others, from Aristotle down through Sartre and Chisholm, for he alone gives a detailed, closeup picture of just how free will works'⁵³, and this in itself is worthy of examination and a point in favour of examining James through non-Deweyan spectacles. However, this large matter will not be our main focus here. Rather, we ought first to recognise that Dewey's misleading selectivity here was quite possibly motivated at least in part by good intentions, namely to bypass the Jamesian work that depended heavily on introspection because the introspective method in psychology had by then become severely discredited. However, introspection mattered greatly to James in terms of his philosophical orientation, partly because it harmonised with the panpsychist tendencies of his later years and the animating spirit of those writings, the wish to penetrate to the inner life of everything. 'Whereas Dewey viewed the other person primarily as a co-worker in a cooperative venture to realise some shared goal, James wanted to "I-Thou" this person, in fact the universe at large' observes Gale, and with both radical empiricism and panpsychism geared to breaking down traditional dichotomies, introspective analysis 'afforded him a way of preventing the bifurcation of man and nature, his ultimate enemy because it strips the world of any human meaning or value'⁵⁴.

These concerns lead us back to the Romantic aspect of James, and his concern with areas of experience that are decidedly un-Deweyan. In an excellent treatment, Hugh McDonald convincingly demonstrates that Deweyan pragmatism can incorporate intrinsic value in nature, but he takes it for granted that intrinsic value is the *sine qua non* of an appropriate environmental ethic and acknowledges that Dewey, keen to minimise the subjectivist image of pragmatism, repudiates any 'private, introspective view of the field of values'⁵⁵ just as he was keen to abandon introspection in psychology. In the space that remains, I want to suggest that this tendency to repudiate introspection, allied to his emphasis on change and growth, led Dewey to overlook significant areas of experience that James attends to, and moreover that a Jamesian environmental ethics might be able to offer a broader conception of values and a wider range of application than a Deweyan one, whilst at the same time linking back to significant values and thinkers in the Western environmental tradition.

2) *James contra Dewey: Quietness, Pure Experience and Environmental Values*

The key James-Dewey difference for our purposes is given by Milton Mayeroff. Mayeroff observes that Dewey's concern for the social and for growth gives a dynamic, problem solving character to his account of experience; Dewey is always keen for us to be up and doing, and in this his work seems to exclude what Mayeroff calls 'a "quiet dimension of experience"⁵⁶. As Mayeroff puts it:

There is little appreciation in Dewey's writings of such quiet and simple experiences as listening to the rain drops outside one's window, or in the stillness watching the snow flakes come down, or looking at the sea. These experiences do not have many of those features which Dewey believes to be characteristic of experience when it is 'integral' and significant. They do not have a funding of meanings; past and future do not serve as present directives; scientific information is not a handmaiden of the aesthetic as the culmination of nature; there is no perception of the relation between 'doing' and 'undergoing'; there is no buildup of 'an experience'; and there is certainly no estimate, stir, and action on behalf of the possible.⁵⁷

In experiences of this sort, Mayeroff observes, 'there is a heightened sense of awareness not involving any direction or intervention on our part'; such quietness 'is something positive and pervasive, a kind of unchanging fullness out of which particular happenings originate and into which they return', an 'inclusive context which is the background for any and all happenings'⁵⁸. Yet Dewey, with his repudiation of introspection, has little to say about them – little to say about the moments of quiet when we simply experience awareness, let alone any conception that such experiences may be deeply significant *for* human growth.

Quite the reverse, however, is true of James. James's radical empiricism, with its close relationship to phenomenology, exists not only as a predecessor to Dewey's work but as a scheme in which the experiential areas which Dewey scarcely attends to – the quiet domain, the relatively non-social, non-directed and predescriptive aspects of sensory perception – are given their due. The purity of pure experience, after all, is defined by James as being 'only a relative term, meaning the proportional amount of unverballed sensation which it still embodies' for 'only new born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a *that* which is not yet any definite *what*'⁵⁹, and this sensitivity to the process of the private, developmental area of experience is thoroughly Jamesian and emerges in part from his loyalty to introspection. As such, far from ignoring the quieter and more personal domains of experience as Dewey does, James can be seen as focusing on them in important ways. In his essay 'On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings', of which he presented multiple versions to students and wider audiences, James points in part precisely to the germinatory possibilities of such quiet experiences: life, he maintains, 'is always worth living, if one has such responsive sensibilities' as to enable 'the intense interest that life can assume when brought down to the... level of pure sensorial experience'⁶⁰. Such experiences involve a certain receptivity and willingness to cognitively let be rather than impose preset patterns, yet for this very reason they can be the wellsprings of fresh acquaintance with reality and new understandings. They contain, James tells us in radically empiricist mode, 'a depth... that constrains us to ascribe more reality to them than to all other experiences'⁶¹. Ralph Barton Perry captures well this broader Jamesian unity of the requirements for receptivity, fulfilment and philosophical success:

There are occasional moments when experience is most fully tasted - in the exhilaration of a fresh morning, in moments of suffering, or in times of triumphant effort, when the tang is strong, when every nuance or overtone is

present. James would arrest us at such moments and say, 'There, *that* is it. Reality is like *that*.' But our worldly minds are filled with ready-made ideas, and when we experience reality it usually has these ideas already stamped upon it. Our minds are accustomed to various short cuts, omissions, and abbreviations dictated by practical convenience, and what these omit we do not commonly apprehend. Hence the metaphysical vision, like the seeing of the painter, involves a recovery of innocence, a capture of the elusive, an unnatural access of sensitiveness.⁶²

James himself, speaking of the quiet dimension of experience, refers to such experiences in which preset patterns are minimised as having a 'sense of hidden meaning' which often 'makes an epoch in his history' for the subject and which 'starts upon us often from non-human natural things'⁶³. On these grounds, we might say that although what we may say about experiences is always socially mediated, direct experiences themselves are not all *equally* socially mediated or constructed; some experiences really are more pure, more direct, more immediately sensory and thus more natural than others, and they are so precisely to the extent that they are not yet verbalised into received ideas and instrumental shortcuts, a point to which I shall return shortly. Despite his own affection for wilderness experience James does not explicitly cash out why non-human natural things may be so given to generating this effect, but I shall now lay out some suggestions as to why this may be, and how James's account might be used to enrich environmental philosophy.

First, we should note that James's introspective attention to such moments explicitly points to gaps in instrumentality, to moments that do not fit into either a means or an end side to an instrumentalist ledger of activity. In similar vein, Anthony Weston complained some years ago that intrinsic value theory was insufficiently radical and experientially sensitive in dealing with the valuing of nature as it actually happens in concrete experience, for shifting moral weight from the means to the ends side of the ledger misses the point if examining relational webs with a means-ends distinction and a loaded set of associations immediately in hand is itself the major problem⁶⁴. If a major part of what we value about nature is its spontaneity and patterns, its counterpointing of the everyday instrumental planning of our lives, then acknowledgment of a more radical gap in instrumental rationality itself is needed, and accordingly Weston suggests what he calls 'immediate values', of either episodic or patterned types to better capture the reality of valuing nature. Such values chime with James's injunctions (although Weston himself is a Deweyan) and do not fit into either the means or ends side of the instrumental ledger; rather 'they are more like surprises or gifts, not amenable to production on demand or to ordinary goal-seeking rationality'⁶⁵.

I believe that Weston's claims are interesting and deserve far more discussion than they have received. When nature draws us out of ourselves, it seems odd to claim that this makes it either a means or an end. If we have our attention attracted by a hawk's swoop outside the window, or watch the busy movements of ants above ground with fascination, what is happening is not an instrumentalization or an acknowledgment of other 'ends'. We think of these experiences as 'drawing us out of ourselves', but *what* we are being drawn out of is narrowness of focus, a concern solely with prospects and plans (both manifestations of instrumental rationality) of ourselves or those close to our world of shared symbols.

Similarly, the therapeutic effects of nature for the depressed are well-known, but the extraction of value is non-automatic, as Leopold insisted⁶⁶. If the depression's cause is inability to cope with the abstract instrumental rationality of contemporary life, then reclassifying nature as 'end' fails to capture the matter. The experiential paradox is this: *nature can fulfil instrumental purposes of mental well-being only if we avoid initially approaching it with instrumental rationality in mind*. Self-consciously seeking such experience as an end is self-contradictory, like making an effort to get to sleep, if the major attraction of the experience is its contrast to everyday instrumentalities. The depressive's worries and confusions are healed, if they are healed, through contextualisation, coming to matter less because the means-ends categories of instrumental rationality are themselves bracketed, and this appears to be a point which a Jamesian environmental ethic can incorporate but a Deweyan one will have significant difficulty with. In dealing with this side of valuational experience, a Jamesian environmental ethic looks backwards to the Romantic tradition and the strong traditions of aesthetic, spiritual and experiential emphasis on nature, but it does so without committing itself solely to any of these domains. For James, as Goodman observes, in such experiential arenas there is 'a sense of mystery and wonder about such moments, but the mystery comes within human awareness itself, not from divine intervention and not from what Emerson called "a foreign addition"'⁶⁷; as such, the experiential language of the non-instrumental values involved can capture the intuitions of both the secular and the religiously inclined without demanding dogmatic conversion from either. Moreover, it should be noted that this connection to immediacy and the Romantic tradition is via the radical empiricist side of James's thought; nothing is lost on the more hard-headed pragmatist side of the issue, where the wide ranging and more familiar types of policy argument can still be advanced. It might, for example, be accurate to express and motivate local environmental action by reference to such Westonian immediate values, but campaign for federal laws by using the language of intrinsic value, since law is an area necessarily connected to and justifiable in terms of means-end managerial rationality. What is given by the Jamesian component is an anti-reductionist commitment to better appreciate the noninstrumental elements in the experiential dimension of valuing nature, a commitment that may better capture the value of nature as experienced, and also help bring on board those environmentalists who see pragmatism as too managerialist or technocratic a tradition to properly capture the valuing of nature.

3) James, Pure Experience and the Ontology of Nature: A Sketch

We now turn to why it may be that the types of experience referred to by James and Weston 'starts upon us often from non-human natural things', and the types of lesson for environmental ethics that may be drawn from them. I suggest that it is not mere chance that such experiences come to us often from nature, because nature is precisely the manifestation of that which has not already been predefined by human purposes, that which has yet to be allocated into an instrumental order in the mind. It is for this reason, I suggest, that nature experience has so often been associated with human freedom, creativity, inspiration and inventiveness: experiences of the sort described require an initial receptivity, but are linked to these traits through their capacity to surprise, to break through the stereotypical patterns of our existing instrumental orientations to the world. In doing so, they can not only render problematic the sort of radical instrumentalism that now dominates our lives but also offer

the possibility of new reflections and thus of new ends and goals; they thus offer the opportunity of new growth, questioning and imagination, of seeing beyond the enclosing framework in which we habitually operate. (Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that it is no accident from this perspective that nature is so frequently an oppositional operator to totalitarian authority in dystopian works, but that is only a side concern here⁶⁸). Without independent natural dynamics by which to be fascinated, there would be little to stand in the way of increasing managerial reduction, and in this sense we can see an important sense in which nature can be seen as experientially supporting liberty, albeit in not quite the terms that some anti-government wilderness enthusiasts like Edward Abbey have suggested.

The obvious objection here, of course, is that nature as a point apart from human impact is no more. We cannot know any such nature separate from human design and intentionality and even if it once existed, it no longer does so. If nature and culture are irrevocably mingled, then ideas of nature's value and significance as a counterpoint to human will must be jettisoned – the familiar 'death of nature' hypothesis. But here too, James can help us proceed.

I have given a detailed explanation of a partly Jamesian response to these questions elsewhere, and given space restrictions, what follows must necessarily be the briefest of summaries of it; I cannot, unfortunately, include the important aspects of historical critique that my full paper gives, or the full nuances of the argument⁶⁹. However, we should begin by noting that the claims of nature being wholly socially constructed and of the mixing of human activity with nature having eliminated any possibility of talking about nature's own dynamics both presuppose a dualistic notion of absolute purity in which it is assumed that nature's ontological definition and/or relative independence is wholly eliminated by any sort of human contact. This I believe to be importantly mistaken. Firstly, we can assert on Jamesian grounds that all nature experience we can speak of is human experience; we can even acknowledge that our discussions of nature experience involve descriptive language and that in this sense, as James put it, 'the trail of the human serpent is thus over everything'⁷⁰; but it will not follow, as we have already suggested on radical empiricist grounds, that the trail in question is *equally* over everything in experience. Similarly, there is an obvious, trivial sense in which all human behaviour must be, however distantly, the result of natural *capacities*, and in this sense it is true that all human acts are natural. But there is a further sense of the term 'natural' in which we refer to commonalities shared across species, as well as to instincts (e.g. the need for sustenance), sensory faculties (the five senses) and emotions (e.g. sorrow) which human beings will manifest in childhood and regardless of cultural upbringing. Capacities, such as literacy, language acquisition and the ability to use a computer, require particular forms of human social stimulation and training to be developed; instincts and emotions will indeed take different objects, according to environment, but they are not systematically generated through learning and exposure to a specifically human and humanized set of symbols and artifacts. There is a difference between *natural commonalities*, which we are born with, and our *human capacities*, which are developed through active exposure to the particular symbolic order of society.⁷¹ There is a related distinction between immediate sensory acquaintance with the world - 'acquaintance-knowledge' or 'pure experience' - and the knowledge and symbolic apparatus which we use to engage with that world ('knowledge-about', or 'the stock of truths' in Jamesian terms).⁷²

The possibility thus exists, once we have bitten the bullet and acknowledged the unavailability of human experience as our touchstone, of mapping a distinction between nature and artifact which has its roots in the different elements of human *inner* nature and engagement with the world rather than by simply opposing man and nature as ontologically separate as such.

Artificiality is given as the antonym to nature here because it embodies (often calculative) instrumental rationality of the sort that is minimally present in the 'pure experience' of unverballed sensation. If we now take James's account of the human cognitive truth-seeking process in *Pragmatism* as our model, we can see that it has three parts: the initial sensory flux, the relations obtaining between this and the mental 'copies' that we then work on, and our existing stock of abstract truths from culture and past personal experience. These are the elements, James tells us in *Pragmatism*, that truth investigations must take account of, and amongst these parts, it is 'only the smallest and recentest fraction of the first two parts of reality that comes to us without the human touch, and that fraction has immediately to become humanised in the sense of being squared, assimilated, or in some way adapted, to the humanised mass already there'.⁷³ If we now take these three parts as being the basis for an ontological spectrum of nature and artifact, arguing by analogy as we go and thinking in terms of human experience of nature whilst acknowledging that each point on the spectrum may slip into the next, we can set up a tripartite ontological spectrum (ideally done in combination with a historical critique) in which nature is defined negatively, by what it is not. We may parallel the Jamesian cognitive process into the ontology of 'external' nature as follows: *just as the relative purity of pure experience is proportional on a spectrum to the amount of unverballed sensation embodied in it, as against the verbal instrumental short-cuts which define significance and purposes, so the extent of an item's 'naturalness' is in inverse proportion to the amount of abstract instrumentalisation which the item has undergone.* Thus 'pure experience' parallels wilderness; for even though we may never experience a wilderness that has not been in any way touched by humans, just as we never actually experience a wholly pure sensation, it can nonetheless be recognised as a primordial point for all that follows, the 'raw material out of which mankind has hammered the artifact called civilisation' as Leopold called it⁷⁴. The second part of the spectrum, correlating to the interaction between sensations and the mental 'copies' that have been produced by preceding experience, reflection and instrumental reasoning, may be seen to cover areas where nonhuman nature and humans meet, but where nonhuman nature's dynamics are not wholly muted. Just as raw sensory experience interacts with past abstract copies which impact upon it and help edit it without (yet) wholly turning it into something else, so here we can place areas of nature that bear the marks of past human activity and still interact with humans now but have retained or regained their dynamic. Accordingly, this second ontological category would include such items as English hedgerows, national and local parks, organic farms, even informal gardens and city-country fingers, with gradations within this broad category to reflect the extent to which human instrumental design is absent and thus the dynamics are fluid, not pre-chosen and designed. Nature is thus present here, crucially, to the extent that it has either not been transformed by human instrumental activity, or has retained its own dynamics in the face of such human activity. Finally, we may turn to the third area, correlating to the Jamesian stock of truths, a stock of instruments for use in the world, and here we move to the area where modest culture slides into true

artificiality, to finished products that are manifestations of human instrumental rationality and have their dynamics defined by this rather than retaining a level of independence; artifacts are wholly transformed and humanised. The category thus covers a very wide range, from ploughshares to cities, but in principle a historical critique may assist in differentiating artifacticity from artificiality in the pejorative sense of the term. The resultant spectrum may accordingly be diagrammatically represented as follows:

Parts of Reality	Ontology of Nature/Artifact
Sensory flux	Untransformed Nature
Sensations and Mental `Copies	Borderline Places Modest Culture
Stock of Truths	Completed Artifacts Artificial

The advantages of such a scheme should be clear. Potentially toxic dualisms are undermined, but space remains to speak of wilderness and the ontology of nature, as well as moral and ontological room given for positive human interactions with nature, and this result occurs without either reducing either nature or the human domain wholly to the other.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have tried to argue that William James is a figure who has been both unjustly accused and unjustly neglected in environmental philosophy. To this end, I have first defended him against three primary opponents, and attempted to demonstrate that Jamesian philosophy does not deserve the attacks that have been made upon it, and then demonstrated that his thought is importantly different and in some respects more promising for environmental values than that of John Dewey. I have concluded with two brief explanations of the potential resources that a Jamesian environmental philosophy might offer. I am painfully aware that in the space thus taken up I have left certain loose ends, most obviously with the incomplete treatment of radical empiricism, and have given only the merest sketches of the promise that such an approach may hold, but nonetheless hope that I may have provided the reader with some thought provoking reflections, and perhaps with luck fired some enthusiasm towards a Jamesian environmental philosophy.

ENDNOTES

¹ See Norton, B.G (1991) *Toward Unity Among Environmentalists*, Oxford:Oxford University Press. Further key papers in this debate include Light, A. (1996) 'Compatibilism in Political Ecology', in Light, A. and Katz, E. (1996), *Environmental Pragmatism*, Routledge, London, pp.161-84; Minter, B.A. (1998), 'No Experience Necessary? Foundationalism and the Retreat from Culture in Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Values*, 7, 3, pp.333-48; Callicott, J.B. (1999), 'Silencing Philosophers: Minter and the Foundations of Anti-Foundationalism', *Environmental Values*, 8, 4, pp.499-516; Minter, B.A. (2001), 'Intrinsic Value for Pragmatists?', *Environmental Ethics*, 23, 1, pp.57-75, cited as Minter, (2001); Callicott, J.B. (2002), 'The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse', *Environmental*

Values, 11, 1, pp.3-25, cited as Callicott (2002); Michael, M.A. (2003), 'What's in a Name? Pragmatism, Essentialism and Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Values*, 12, 3, pp.361-79, cited as Michael (2003); Minter, B.A., Corley, E.A., and Manning, R.E. (2004), 'Environmental Ethics Beyond Principle? The Case for a Pragmatic Contextualism', *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, 17, 2, pp.13-56.

2. Callicott, (2002), p.21.

3. Minter, (2001), p.71. Aside from Weston's work and as distinct from this cautious Minter endorsement, probably the closest equivalent to my approach here in adopting a pragmatist perspective that emphasises the axiological component is that of McDonald, H.P. (2004) *John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, New York: SUNY Press. Though sharing an emphasis on values, however, McDonald takes a rather different approach to them than Weston or myself.

⁴ One exception here is Robert C. Fuller's work, though this directly ethical environmental Jamesianism has not since been followed up. See Fuller R.C. (1992) 'American Pragmatism Reconsidered: William James's Ecological Ethic', *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 2, pp.159-76. Cited as Fuller (1992).

⁵ See Thompson, P.B & Hilde, T.C. (2000), *The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism*, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

⁶ Horkheimer, M. (1947) *Eclipse of Reason*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.100-1, 104-5.

⁷ Horkheimer (1947) pp.104-5, 108.

⁸ Cohen, M.R (1931) *Reason and Nature*, New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., p.450.

⁹ Morris, L. (1950) *William James: The Message of a Modern Mind*, London: Charles Scribner's Sons Ltd., p.81. Cited as Morris (1950).

¹⁰ James, W. (1978a) 'Pragmatism', *Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth*, London: Harvard University Press, p.122. Cited as James, *Pragmatism* (1978a).

¹¹ James, W. (1899) 'The Will to Believe', in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, New York: Longmans Green & Co., p.11. Cited as James (1899).

¹² James, W. (1912a) 'The Social Value of the College Bred', *Memories and Studies*, London: Longmans Green & Co., p.311. Cited as James (1912a).

¹³ James, (1912a), 'The Social Value of the College Bred', p.314.

¹⁴ Horkheimer, (1947), pp.46, 50.

¹⁵ James, *Pragmatism*, (1978a) p.6; William James, W. (1978) 'The Meaning of Truth', *Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth*, London: Harvard University Press, p.173. Cited as James, (1978a) *MT*.

¹⁶ James, W. (1912b) *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York: Longmans Green & Co., pp.1-38. Cited as James, (1912b).

¹⁷ James, (1978a) *Pragmatism*, p.32.

¹⁸ James, (1912a), p.351.

¹⁹ William James, (1978a) *MT*, p.267.

²⁰ Cited in Perry, R.B (1936), *The Thought and Character of William James*, (2 Vols.), Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 2, 315. Cited as Perry (1936).

²¹ Perry, (1936) 2, 315.

²² The following observations of Schumacher resonate here: 'A Buddhist economist would consider this [maximal consumption] approach excessively irrational; since consumption is merely a means to human well-being, the aim should be to obtain the maximum of well-being at the minimum of consumption. Thus, if the purpose of clothing is a certain amount of temperature comfort and an attractive appearance, the task is to attain this purpose with the smallest possible effort, that is, *with the smallest annual destruction of cloth and with the help of designs that involve the smallest possible input of toil*. The less toil there is, the more time and strength is left for artistic creativity...*It would be the height of folly to make material so that it should wear out quickly and the height of barbarity to make anything ugly, shabby or mean*. What has just been said about clothing applies equally to all other human requirements. *The ownership and the consumption of goods is a means to an end, and Buddhist economics is the systematic study of how to attain given ends with the minimum means*.' Schumacher, E.F. (1974) *Small is Beautiful*, London: Abacus, p. 47, emphases added. Cited as Schumacher (1974). The similarity to James's praise of the artisan, focus on the means-ends relation, and injunctions against shoddiness is most striking here.

²³ James, (1978a) *Pragmatism*, p.106; my emphasis.

24. Hargrove, E.C. (1989), *Foundations of Environmental Ethics*, New York: Prentice Hall, pp.208-9.

25. James, W. (1918), *The Principles of Psychology*, (2 Vols), Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 2, 179. Cited as James, (1918).

26. Norton notes that 'Muir justified the preservation of the beauties of nature because he thought experience of nature cures the alienation of modern society' and 'saw humans as capable of a consciousness higher than the make-a-buck mentality of the exploitationists, who emphasised only production and consumption'. Norton (1991), p.79, my emphases.

27. Norton, (1991), p.83, my emphasis.

28. James, W. (1912a), 'Louis Agassiz', pp.14-15, my emphasis.

29. Ayer notes that Peirce felt the need to distinguish his formalistic pragmatism from the Jamesian variety sufficiently strongly to actually change the name, referring to his own brand as 'pragmaticism'; however, the change was never widely adopted and rapidly died out. Ayer, A.J. (1968), *The Origins of Pragmatism*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., pp.13-14. Cited as Ayer, (1968).

30. See, for example, Scitovsky, T. (1976), *The Joyless Economy*, London: Oxford University Press, pp.31-58. Scitovsky's language - 'intrinsic exploration', for instance - remains within the means-ends dichotomy, but his examples tend to contradict it.

³¹ For example, Konrad Lorenz has drawn attention to the fact that *curiosity* exists in animals as 'low' in intelligence as ravens and Norway rats, for such creatures actively investigate their surroundings, and 'it is quite evident that such investigations are *not* direct responses to environmental needs'. Cited in Munévar, G. (1981), *Radical Knowledge*, Avebury: Amersham, p.67.

32. Cited in Bronowski, J. (1976), *The Ascent of Man*, London: BBC Publications, p.271. Though Franklin's thought was a complex hybrid of multifarious influences, it is interesting to note that there is considerable evidence of his holding proto-pragmatist views influenced by

-
- indigenous American ideas. See Pratt, S.L. (2002), *Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp.171-215.
33. Regan, T. (1981), 'The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic', *Environmental Ethics*, 3,1, pp.19-34. Regan's primary given alternative to strong preservationism in this article is heavily anthropocentric and called a 'management ethic'.
34. Wordsworth, W. (1973), 'Tintern Abbey', in Bloom H. & Trilling L. (Eds.), *Romantic Poetry and Prose*, London: Oxford University Press, p.149.
35. Goodman, R.B. (1990), *American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p.59. Cited as Goodman (1990).
36. Dooley, P.K. (1974), *Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy of William James*, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, p.22. Cited as Dooley, (1974).
37. Fuller, R.C. (1992), p.163. See also James, (1918), 1, 139-41.
38. I use the term 'quasi-essentialist' to indicate the naturalistic component in pragmatic thought; it should not be taken as indicative of an unchanging ontological 'essence', or the policy 'essentialism' attributed to Callicott in Michael (2003). Rather, it points to the unavoidably interactive character of humans with their environment, and to the role of social and evolutionary time in generating and testing humans and their values.
39. James's numerous attacks on the excesses of Herbert Spencer were targeted largely at Spencer's reduction of mind, with its attribution of survival as the single lasting core value of human activity. James, W. (1978b), *Essays in Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, London, pp.7-22, 96-101, 107-22. Cited as James, (1978b).
40. For a sceptical view on the difficulties of knowing another type of consciousness from the inside, see Nagel, T. (1974), 'What is it Like to Be a Bat?', *Philosophical Review*, 83, 4, pp.435-50.
41. Rolston, H. (1989), *Philosophy Gone Wild*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, pp.30-31, 91-2; also Rolston, H. (1988), *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp.33, 111. The same paragraph with similar demonising is used in much the same decontextualised way in Plumwood, V. (1993), *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, Routledge, London, pp.71, 120; cited as Plumwood (1993). It is a mark of Rolston's influence and immense contribution to the field that other eminent thinkers follow him so trustingly. An earlier criticism is Leiss's, who sees James's essay as a 'Baconian scenario' in which 'the aggressiveness involved in human ambition' can be 'turned loose against the environment... without the sense of guilt'; Leiss, W. (1978), *The Limits to Satisfaction: On Needs and Commodities*, Marion Boyars, London, p.51. As should become clear, this is off the mark: Jamesian epistemology *can* be adopted without accepting Baconian hubris.
42. James, W. (1899), 'Is Life Worth Living?', in James (1899), pp.43-4.
43. James, (1899), p.44.
44. Rolston, (1989), p.91; See also James, W. (1902), *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., p.150; Fuller, (1992), p.164ff.

-
45. Bird, G. (1986), *William James*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.147.
46. James, W. (1912a), 'The Moral Equivalent of War', pp.286-7.
47. We might add that James and H.G Wells were on friendly terms and that the Wellsian influence on James's thought is confirmed by Hofstadter, R. (1969), *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, New York: George Braziller Inc., p.135, fn.40.
48. James, W. (1912a), 'The Moral Equivalent of War', pp.289-91.
49. On gender relations, James was sympathetic to female emancipation, especially politically, but less radical than J.S. Mill, and thus a man of his time but no reactionary. On this topic, see Myers, G.E. (1986), *William James: His Life and Thought*, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.424-29. Cited as Myers, (1986).
50. . James, (1912a), 'The Moral Equivalent of War', p.291; Leopold, (1987), p.216; Rolston, (1988), p.91.
51. Myers, (1986), p.602.
- ⁵² Gale, R.M (1999), *The Divided Self of William James*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p.335.
- ⁵³ Gale (1999), p.343.
- ⁵⁴ Gale (1999), p.349.
- ⁵⁵ Dewey, J. (1949), 'The Field of Value', in Lepley, R. (Ed), *Value: A Cooperative Enquiry*, New York: Columbia University Press, p.66. See also McDonald (2004).
- 56.Mayeroff, M. (1963), 'A Neglected Aspect of Experience in Dewey's Philosophy', *Journal of Philosophy*, 60, 6, p.146.
- ⁵⁷ Mayeroff (1963), p.148
- ⁵⁸ Mayeroff (1963), pp.148, 152.
- ⁵⁹ James, (1912b), pp.93-4.
- ⁶⁰ James, W. (1929) 'On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings', *Selected Papers in Philosophy*, London: Everyman, pp17-19. Cited as James, (1929).
- ⁶¹ James (1929), p.9.
- 62.Perry, (1936), 2, 683-4.
- ⁶³ James (1929), p.9.
- ⁶⁴ Weston, A. (1992), 'Between Means and Ends'. *The Monist*, 75, 2, pp.236-49. Cited as Weston (1992).
- ⁶⁵ Weston, A. (1992), p.237.
- 66.Leopold, A. (1987), *A Sand County Almanac*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.179. Cited as Leopold, (1987).

⁶⁷ Goodman, (1990), p.60.

⁶⁸ Stephens, P.H.G. (2004), 'Nature and Human Liberty: The Golden Country in George Orwell's 1984 and an Alternative Conception of Human Freedom', *Organization and Environment*, 17, 1, pp.76-98. See also my forthcoming Routledge book *Nature, Liberty and Dystopia: On the Moral Significance of Nature for Human Freedom*.

⁶⁹ For a full explication, see Stephens, P.H.G. (2000), 'Nature, Purity, Ontology', *Environmental Values*, 9, 3, pp.267-94.

⁷⁰ James, (1978a) *Pragmatism*, p.37.

71. The classic capacity which enables the transmission and development of other capacities is symbolic human language, which differs from other primate communication in the extent of conceptual abstraction enabled. For examples of humans whose development differed widely through being socialised by non-human animals, see Weston, A. (1994), *Back to Earth: Tomorrow's Environmentalism*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp.43-55.

72. James used the former of each of these terms in his psychology, the latter in his philosophy. See respectively James (1918) and James (1978a).

73. James (1978a), p.119.

⁷⁴ Leopold (1987), p.188.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayer, A.J. (1968), *The Origins of Pragmatism*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Bird, G. (1986), *William James*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bloom H. & Trilling L. (Eds.), *Romantic Poetry and Prose*, London: Oxford University Press.

Bronowski, J. (1976), *The Ascent of Man*, London: BBC Publications.

Callicott, J.B. (1999), 'Silencing Philosophers: Minter and the Foundations of Anti-Foundationalism', *Environmental Values*, 8, 4, pp.499-516.

Callicott, J.B. (2002), 'The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse', *Environmental Values*, 11, 1, pp.3-25.

Cohen, M.R (1931) *Reason and Nature*, New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.

Dewey, J. (1949), 'The Field of Value', in Lepley, R. (Ed), *Value: A Cooperative Enquiry*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Dooley, P.K. (1974), *Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy of William James*, Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Fuller R.C. (1992) 'American Pragmatism Reconsidered: William James's Ecological Ethic', *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 2, pp.159-76.

Gale, R.M (1999), *The Divided Self of William James*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goodman, R.B. (1990), *American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hargrove, E.C. (1989), *Foundations of Environmental Ethics*, New York: Prentice Hall

-
- Hofstadter, R. (1969), *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, New York: George Braziller Inc.
- Horkheimer, M. (1947) *Eclipse of Reason*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- James, W. (1899), *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, New York: Longmans Green & Co.
- James, W. (1902), *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York: Longmans, Green & Co.
- James, W. (1912a), *Memories and Studies*, London: Longmans Green & Co.
- James, W. (1912b) *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York: Longmans Green & Co.
- James, W. (1918), *The Principles of Psychology*, (2 Vols), Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London.
- James, W. (1929), *Selected Papers in Philosophy*, London: Everyman.
- James, W. (1978a), *Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth*, London: Harvard University Press.
- James, W. (1978b), *Essays in Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, London.
- Leiss, W. (1978), *The Limits to Satisfaction: On Needs and Commodities*, Marion Boyars, London.
- Leopold, A. (1987), *A Sand County Almanac*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Lepley, R. (Ed), *Value: A Cooperative Enquiry*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Light, A. (1996) 'Compatibilism in Political Ecology', in Light, A. and Katz, E. (1996), *Environmental Pragmatism*, Routledge, London, pp.161-8.
- Light, A. and Katz, E. (1996), *Environmental Pragmatism*, Routledge, London.
- Mayeroff, M. (1963), 'A Neglected Aspect of Experience in Dewey's Philosophy', *Journal of Philosophy*, 60, 6, pp.146-53.
- McDonald, H.P. (2004) *John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, New York: SUNY Press.
- Michael, M.A. (2003), 'What's in a Name? Pragmatism, Essentialism and Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Values*, 12, 3, pp.361-79.
- Minteer, B.A. (1998), 'No Experience Necessary? Foundationalism and the Retreat from Culture in Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Values*, 7, 3, pp.333-48.
- Minteer, B.A. (2001), 'Intrinsic Value for Pragmatists?', *Environmental Ethics*, 23, 1, pp.57-75
- Minteer, B.A., Corley, E.A., and Manning, R.E. (2004), 'Environmental Ethics Beyond Principle? The Case for a Pragmatic Contextualism', *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, 17, 2, pp.13-56.
- Morris, L. (1950) *William James: The Message of a Modern Mind*, London: Charles Scribner's Sons Ltd.
- Munévar, G. (1981), *Radical Knowledge*, Avebury: Amersham.
- Myers, G.E. (1986), *William James: His Life and Thought*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Nagel, T. (1974), 'What is it Like to Be a Bat?', *Philosophical Review*, 83, 4, pp.435-50.
- Norton, B.G (1991) *Toward Unity Among Environmentalists*, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
- Perry, R.B (1936), *The Thought and Character of William James*, (2 Vols.), Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
- Plumwood, V. (1993), *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, Routledge, London.

-
- Pratt, S.L. (2002), *Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Regan, T. (1981), 'The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic', *Environmental Ethics*, 3,1, pp.19-34.
- Rolston, H. (1988), *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Rolston, H. (1989), *Philosophy Gone Wild*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Schumacher, E.F. (1974) *Small is Beautiful*, London: Abacus.
- Scitovsky, T. (1976), *The Joyless Economy*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Stephens, P.H.G. (2000), 'Nature, Purity, Ontology', *Environmental Values*, 9, 3, pp.267-94.
- Stephens, P.H.G. (2004), 'Nature and Human Liberty: The Golden Country in George Orwell's 1984 and an Alternative Conception of Human Freedom', *Organization and Environment*, 17, 1, pp.76-98.
- Stephens, P.H.G. (forthcoming), *Nature, Liberty and Dystopia: On the Moral Significance of Nature for Human Freedom*, London: Routledge.
- Thompson, P.B & Hilde, T.C. (2000), *The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism*, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Weston, A. (1985), 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, 7, 4, pp.321-39.
- Weston, A. (1992), 'Between Means and Ends'. *The Monist*, 75, 2, pp.236-49.
- Weston, A. (1994), *Back to Earth: Tomorrow's Environmentalism*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Wordsworth, W. (1973), 'Tintern Abbey', in Bloom H. & Trilling L. (Eds.), *Romantic Poetry and Prose*, London: Oxford University Press.